How Parrhesia Works through Art  The Elusive Role of the Imagination in Truth-Telling by Paijmans, Marrigje
 Foucault Studies, No. 26, p. 42-63 42  
© Marrighe Paijmans 
ISSN: 1832-5203 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.22439/fs.v0i26.5750 
Foucault Studies, No. 26, s. 42-63 June 2019  
ARTICLE 
How Parrhesia Works through Art 
The Elusive Role of the Imagination in Truth-Telling 
MARRIGJE PAIJMANS 
University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
 
ABSTRACT. In his late lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault underpins the pre-eminence of 
art as the modern site of parrhesia. He omits, however, the aesthetic question: how does parrhesia 
work through art? A compelling question, firstly, because “truth-telling” seems to be at odds with 
art as an imaginative process. Secondly, because parrhesia implies a transformation in the listener, 
while Foucault’s limited notion of discourse precludes transformation beyond discourse. This 
essay hypothesizes that parrhesiastic art effects a transformation in the imagination, without 
dismissing this transformation as unreal. As Foucault’s utterances about the imagination are 
restricted to his earliest publications, this essay features a combined reading of Foucault’s early 
and late discussions of art. To further analyze the elusive role of the imagination in the late 
discussions, the essay employs the Deleuzian notion of “dramatization”, an epistemological 
method that draws on the imagination to escape representational thought. The essay thus aims to 
demonstrate that parrhesia mirrors the artwork in its intuitive and dynamic relation to truth. 
Subsequently, it argues that Foucault and Deleuze, respectively proceeding from a limited and an 
unlimited mode of thinking, come infinitely close in their thinking of art. 
Keywords: Parrhesia, art, truth, imagination, dramatization, Gilles Deleuze, Oedipus, Manet. 
INTRODUCTION 
In his last lectures at the Collège de France, Michel Foucault frequently refers to works of 
art and literature as sites of parrhesia: “in the modern world, in our world, it is especially 
in art that the most intense forms of a truth-telling with the courage to take the risk of 
offending are concentrated.”1 His discussions of Euripides’s tragedies in interaction with 
the Athenian democracy, or the French impressionists’ provocation of the Paris Salon are 
but two examples, and the series of works discussed by Foucault can easily be extended 
with examples from contemporary art. The works of Ai Wei Wei, Banksy and Elfriede 
                                                 
1 Michel Foucault, The Courage of Truth (The Government of the Self and Others 2). Lectures at the Collège de 
France, 1983-1984, ed. Frédéric Gros (2011), 189. 
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Jelinek, for instance, involve parrhesiastic elements, such as bold speech, the courage to 
confront authority, and the pursuit of a good relation with truth. 
Foucault underpins the pre-eminence of art as the modern site of parrhesia by 
demonstrating that modern art is genealogically related to the classical tradition of 
parrhesia. What he omits, however, is a consideration of the more aesthetic question: how 
does parrhesia work through art?2 Two aspects of parrhesia make this a very compelling 
question. Firstly, there seems to be a tension between, on the one hand, parrhesia as 
“truth-telling” and, on the other, art as a process that involves the imagination. While 
truth is a leading motif in Foucault’s entire oeuvre, utterances about the imagination are 
limited to the earliest publications, as will become apparent in this essay. Foucault’s later 
disinterest in the imagination can be related to his breakaway from modernist avant-garde 
aesthetics, which he dismissed as thoroughly appropriated by the establishment.3 
Additionally, the distinction between truth and imagination may seem less significant if 
one thinks in terms of discourse. In this essay, I will use insights from Foucault’s early 
work to shed light on the elusive role of the imagination in parrhesiastic art. 
Secondly, parrhesia, as a form of speech that “constantly asserts the difference and 
force of truth-telling in the political game and which aims to disturb and transform the 
mode of being of subjects,”4 implies a transformation in the listener. This is problematic 
with regard to Foucault’s limited notion of discourse, which precludes transformation 
beyond discourse.5 The basic assumption of this essay is that the transformation of 
parrhesia takes place in the imagination, which does not amount to a dismissal of this 
transformation as false or unreal. Together these two aspects of parrhesia beg the question 
of how an artwork can articulate an inconvenient truth in such a way that it initiates a 
process of transformation in the imagination of the beholder.  
Parrhesia 
Before offering a hypothesis, though, the notion of parrhesia used in this essay must be 
specified to avoid confusion between its many historical, rhetorical and philosophical 
interpretations.6 This essay concerns the philosophical notion developed by Foucault in 
his last two lecture-series for the Collège de France, “The Government of Self and Others” 
                                                 
2 Other authors who mention this gap are Arpad Szakolczai, The Genesis of Modernity (2003), 142, and 
Julian Brigstocke, “Artistic Parrhesia and the Genealogy of Ethics in Foucault and Benjamin,” Theory, 
Culture & Society 30:1 (2013), 70. 
3 Michel Foucault, “The Functions of Literature,” interview by Roger-Pol Droit, June 20, 1975, in Michel 
Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture. Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman 
(1990), 310. 
4 Michel Foucault, The Government of Self and Others. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982-1983, ed. 
Frédéric Gros (2010), 388. 
5 See e.g. Michel Foucault, An Introduction. The History of Sexuality 1 [1976] (1990), 95. See also Fabio 
Vighi and Heiko Feldner, Žižek. Beyond Foucault (2007), 89-90. 
6 For a historical overview of parrhesia in ancient Greece and the Roman empire, see David Colclough, 
Freedom of Speech in Early Stuart England (2005), 12-37. On the rhetorical device, see Heinrich Lausberg, 
Handbook of Literary Rhetoric. A Foundation for Literary Study (1998), 337-338. 
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(1982-1983) and “The Courage of Truth” (1983-1984), and in the lecture-series for Berkeley 
University, “Discourse and Truth” (1983).7 
For Foucault, parrhesia is a form of truth-telling in which the speaker articulates his 
personal or ethical commitment to truth by boldly revealing an inconvenient truth before 
the other.8 As such, parrhesia always involves a clash between two modes of veridiction 
which require courage from both the speaker and the listener, the latter having to 
acknowledge the truth and to transform his mode of living. It is important to discern that 
the cognitive value of the truth assumed by parrhesia does not reside in either intrinsically 
‘true’ values or social, economic or political structures, but in the form, style, mode or 
practice of truth-telling itself. Foucault motivates his investigation of parrhesia from a 
genealogical and a methodological point of view. Genealogically, he claims that “with the 
question of the importance of telling the truth, knowing who is able to tell the truth, and 
knowing why we should tell the truth, we have the roots of what we could call the ‘critical’ 
tradition in the West.”9 He also refers to this tradition as “alethurgy”, the manifestations 
of truth that are in principle irreducible to any epistemology, as they do not address the 
question of what makes a true knowledge possible, but that of the ethical transformations 
of the subject in the act of telling the truth.10 In The Courage of Truth, Foucault analyses the 
forms in which the individual constitutes himself and is constituted by others as a subject 
of a discourse of truth. The modern epistemological regime has largely hidden the 
necessity and means to speak the truth, according to Foucault.11 The aim of his genealogy 
of parrhesia, as a specific form of truth-telling, is thus to reconnect Western philosophy 
with its alethurgic roots. The element in parrhesia that interests Foucault particularly is 
how it “qualifies the other person who is necessary in the game and obligation of speaking 
the truth about self.”12 Methodologically, the historical incidents of parrhesia serve 
Foucault as “chemical catalysts so as to bring to light power relations.”13 As the workings 
of discourse usually go unnoticed, it is only through the clashes with other discourses, 
when subjects are forced to explicate themselves, that a space opens up in which 
discursive processes become observable. Parrhesia as clash functions as an indicator of the 
limits of historical discourses. Considering that Foucault’s attempts to reveal discursive 
limits in the history of Western philosophy are meant to both confront and transform this 
very history, his genealogical research can be regarded as a form of parrhesia in itself: a 
                                                 
7 Translated from the French: “Le gouvernement de soi et des autres” and “Le courage de la vérité”. 
The Berkeley lectures are published as Fearless Speech, ed. Joseph Pearson (2001). 
8 Foucault, Fearless Speech, 19-20. 
9 Foucault, Fearless Speech, 186. See also Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 33. 
10 A-lētheia indicating “the state of not being hidden”, the neologism “alethurgy” (alēthēs, ērgon) involves 
“the set of possible procedures, verbal or otherwise, by which one brings to light what is posited as 
true, as opposed to the false, the hidden, the unspeakable, the unforeseeable, or the forgotten. . . .” 
Michel Foucault, On the Government of the Living. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1979-1980, ed. Michel 
Senellart (2014), 7, 19. See also Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 3. 
11 Frédéric Gros, “Course Context,” in Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 344. 
12 Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 7. 
13 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” Critical Inquiry 8:4 (1982), 780. 
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working on the limits of Western epistemic discourse, and of his own thought as a 
Western philosopher. 
Dramatization 
In order to trace and analyse the elusive role of the imagination in Foucault’s discussions 
of parrhesiastic art, this essay analyzes two of these discussions using Gilles Deleuze’s 
method of “dramatization”. Deleuze first introduces dramatization in the lecture “The 
Method of Dramatisation” (1967), which he expounds further in Difference and Repetition 
(1968).14 In the lecture, he describes dramatization as an epistemological method to escape 
a mode of thinking that is limited to representation, insofar as the latter reduces examples 
to their logical, formal possibilities.15 The method consists in taking a philosophical 
concept X and avoiding the essentialist question: What is X? Instead one should ask: In 
which case, with whom, how, how much is X? The series of questions will evoke 
sensations and intuitions which cannot be adequately represented by the concept. The 
method reveals that the concepts humans use to think do not follow the logic of 
representation, in the sense that they do not represent clear and distinct ideas.16 Instead, 
these concepts are founded on obscure and/or confused sensibilities and intuitions. 
Dramatization thus reveals that every concept implies the suppression of these 
dynamisms: “A concept being given, we can always seek the drama.”17 
The process of dramatization takes place in the imagination as the first stage of 
knowledge and as the capacity to be affected by the sensations and intuitions which are 
too subtle to be recognized at the latter stages. The fact that the ancient Greek word drama 
literally means “action” indicates that dramatization implies active engagement with the 
sensations and intuitions which would otherwise be overlooked.18 As such, dramatization 
involves an active exploration of the imagination, traversing the space between the 
concept and, what Deleuze calls, ‘the virtual intuitions rooted in the faculty of sensibility’. 
In doing so, dramatization enables a mode of thinking that is radically creative, as 
opposed to re-presentational. In this essay, two central notions or “concepts” in Foucault’s 
                                                 
14 Gilles Deleuze, “The Method of Dramatisation,” paper presented to the Société française de 
Philosophie, January 28th, 1967, Inquietando, n.d. Translated from the French “Théâtre et philosophie: 
la méthode de dramatisation”. 
15 Sjoerd van Tuinen, Marc Schuilenburg and Ed Romein, “Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? De voorwaarden 
van het denken volgens Deleuze en Guattari,” in Deleuze compendium, ed. Ed Romein, Marc 
Schuilenburg and Sjoerd van Tuinen (2009), 33. 
16 As described by Descartes in Principles of Philosophy (1644) I.45, an idea is clear and distinct when it is 
based on clear and distinct perceptions. A perception is clear if it is “open and present to the attending 
mind”, and distinct if it is precise and separated from other ideas, so that it “plainly contains in itself 
nothing other than what is clear.” Selections from the Principles of Philosophy of Rene Descartes (1596-1650), 
ed. John Veitch (1901). 
17 Deleuze, “The Method of Dramatisation,” 583. 
18 For Deleuze on the distinction between thoughts and actions, see Claire Colebrook, Deleuze. A Guide 
for the Perplexed (2006), 69-70. 
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discussions of art are dramatized with the aim to demonstrate how his thinking of art 
relies on the imagination for tapping into the dynamisms beneath the representations.  
Although Foucault and Deleuze worked in the same city, were invested in similar 
topics, and even praised each other’s work,19 their views of how different forms of power 
structure reality and individuation ultimately run up against each other. According to 
Peter Hallward (2000), this is because Deleuze seeks to write a philosophy without limits, 
while Foucault writes a philosophy of the limit as such.20 For Foucault, it is only in the 
confrontation with limits – the limits, for instance, of experience, language, knowledge, 
expression, introspection – that thought becomes aware of itself, and that the subject can 
be “purged” of everything that specifies or objectifies the subject.21 Deleuze, however, 
wants to get rid of the subject altogether, to replace it with a fully “singular” conception 
of the individual. If Foucault’s subject exists only in the medium of relations with others 
and with itself, and turns ultimately on the confrontation of limits, then Deleuze’s singular 
individual transcends all such relations to create the medium of its own “expression”; the 
singular recognizes no limits.22 It can take on any form, and will thus never encounter a 
real other. Transformation or “becoming” is a fundamental principle in Deleuze’s 
thinking, enabled by its immediate relation to the virtual. 
Because of this structural difference, a dramatization of Foucault’s concepts may seem 
a violation of his philosophy. However, this essay aims to demonstrate that, although it 
is true that limits found as well as structure Foucault’s understanding of subjectivation, 
Foucault’s “thinking of art”, as developed in the late lectures on parrhesia, is not in the 
same sense limited, as can be made visible with the method of dramatization. This essay 
aims to show that Foucault and Deleuze, respectively proceeding from a limited and an 
unlimited mode of thinking, come infinitely close in their thinking of art. As such, it 
contributes to the increasingly researched field – especially since the publication of 
Foucault’s late lectures in English – of Foucault and Deleuze Studies.23  
The hypothetical answer to the question of how parrhesia works through art is that the 
artwork triggers a repetitive process of veiling and unveiling of truth in the imagination. 
In this process, limits become visible as thresholds for truth to emerge as an endless search 
through different modes of veridiction. This search, which I designate the “thinking of 
art”, gives expression to the true life, in the same way as an artwork manifests a truly 
artistic life. Accordingly, I will argue, Foucault’s thinking of art can be considered inherent 
                                                 
19 On the personal relation between Foucault and Deleuze, see Francois Ewald’s “Editorial Foreword” 
in the edition of Gilles Deleuze’s “Desire and Pleasure” [1994], Globe EJournal of Contemporary Art 5 
(1997); Richard de Brabander, “Foucault,” in Deleuze compendium, ed. Ed Romein, Marc Schuilenburg 
and Sjoerd van Tuinen (2009), 147-160; Nicolae Morar, Thomas Nail and Daniel Smith, “Introduction,” 
Foucault and Deleuze, special issue of Foucault Studies 17 (2014), 4‐10. 
20 Peter Hallward, “The Limits of Individuation, or How to Distinguish Deleuze and Foucault,” Angelaki 
5:2 (2000), 93. 
21 Hallward, “The Limits of Individuation,” 101. 
22 Hallward, “The Limits of Individuation,” 93. 
23 See, e.g., the recent work of Scott Lash, Judith Revel, Paul Patton, Simon O’Sullivan, and Foucault and 
Deleuze, special issue of Foucault Studies 17 (2014). 
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to parrhesia. It must be noted that Foucault does not omit the aesthetic question of how 
parrhesia works through art inadvertently. In fact, in his late lectures he repeatedly 
emphasizes the rough and explorative nature of his ideas, avoiding advancing a 
philosophical theory of art, truth, imagination or subjectivity.24 By implementing 
Deleuze’s method of dramatization, which is based on such theories, this essay does not 
aim to make Foucault less Foucauldian and more Deleuzian. By attending to the non-
generalisable and without losing sight of how each artwork functions in a specific 
genealogy, it endeavors to shed new light and generate discussion on the relation between 
parrhesia and art in Foucault’s late lectures. 
Outline 
The first part of this essay explains why the working of parrhesia through art is 
problematic with respect to Foucault’s view of discourse. It does so by taking a brief 
survey of the function of art in Foucault’s work, concentrating on art’s critical potential. 
In the second and third parts of the essay, two central notions in Foucault’s discussions of 
art are dramatized, analyzing how the imagination is implicated in parrhesiastic art. From 
the first discussion, on Sophocles’s tragedy Oedipus King (429 BC) in The Government of Self 
and Others, Foucault’s concept of “truth” will be dramatized. From the second discussion, 
on Édouard Manet’s painting Luncheon on the Grass (1863) in The Courage of the Truth, 
Foucault’s concept of the “basic”, as that what is being expressed in art, will be 
dramatized. 
1. THE THINKING OF ART 
Retrospectively, Foucault’s career can be recognized as consistently devoted to the search 
for a free subject. However, he has approached this topic on different levels, making the 
recognition of their overarching coherence less clear at times. Across these levels, the 
function and critical potential of art would vary, as a brief survey over three levels of 
analysis in Foucault’s research makes clear. First, Foucault’s understanding of art and 
literature on the level of discourse is outlined, based on four texts from Foucault’s early 
career. Subsequently, the virtual absences of art in his work from the 1970s is explained 
by assuming the level of power. Finally, the return of art in the lectures at the College de 
France is examined on the level of the subject, highlighting the role of art for the practices 
through which the subject ethically transforms itself. 
Art and Discourse 
Quite some time before Foucault introduces his notion of discourse, he already expresses 
concern about processes of “subjectivation”, i.e., the production and ordering of 
knowledge about individuals that turns them into objects of knowledge and subjects of 
                                                 
24 This approach seems related to the Cynic assertion “[t]hat philosophy not only can, but must have a 
limited, poor, schematic doctrinal framework.” Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 204. 
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power. It concerns his earliest publication, the introduction to Ludwig Binswanger’s 
Dream and Existence (1954), which contains some significant remarks about the 
imagination in relation to subjectivation.25 Subjectivation harms “the freedom of man in 
its original form”,26 but it can be resisted through the imagination: “to imagine . . . is to 
intend oneself as a movement of freedom that makes itself world.”27 A threat to this form 
of resistance is that, once the imagination is frozen in a particular image, it becomes inert. 
To be free, the imagination must keep moving from one image to the other. 
Foucault’s famous discussion of Diego Velasquez’ Las meninas (1656) in The Order of 
Things (1966) describes how art can facilitate the movement of the imagination. Even 
though subjects cannot as a rule escape their episteme, the a priori that grounds knowledge 
and its discourses within a historical period, Las meninas enables the viewer to experience 
different epistemic standpoints: that of the sovereign ruler, the depicting artist, and the 
perceiving subject. Foucault relates these standpoints to the epistemes of, respectively, the 
Renaissance, Classicism, and Modernity.28 When looking at Las meninas, the viewer moves 
through different epistemes, enabled by art’s “analytic of imagination, as a positive power 
to transform the linear time of representation into a simultaneous space containing virtual 
elements.”29 The “interepistemic” position of the artwork in The Order of Things thereby 
provides a basis for resistance against subjectivation as described in Dream and Existence. 
The critical function of art is further specified in History of Madness (1961). Foucault 
locates madness outside discourse, indicating that the mad are deprived of their 
subjectivity. Literature dwells at the limit of discourse, where it is confronted by madness: 
“By the madness that interrupts it, an oeuvre opens a void, a moment of silence, a question 
without an answer, opening an unhealable wound that the world is forced to address.”30 
The void opened up by art may be silent in terms of discourse, but in terms of affect it 
makes a very strong appeal to the world. The critical function of art is to be sensitive to 
these wounds, not to heal them, but for them to be acknowledged.  
This process is described in more detail in Foucault’s essay “Maurice Blanchot: The 
Thought from Outside” (1966):  
When language arrives at its own edge, what it finds is not a positivity that contradicts 
it, but the void that will efface it. Into that void it must go, consenting to come undone 
                                                 
25 Michel Foucault, “Dream, Imagination and Existence,” Review of Existential Psychology & Psychiatry 
19:1 (1984-1985), 29-78. 
26 Foucault, “Dream, Imagination and Existence,” 53. 
27 Foucault, “Dream, Imagination and Existence,” 68. 
28 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things. An Archaeology of the Human Sciences [1966] (1996), 14-15; Joseph 
Tanke, Foucault’s Philosophy of Art. A Genealogy of Modernity (2009), 18. 
29 Foucault, The Order of Things, 68-69. 
30 Michel Foucault, The History of Madness [1961], ed. Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa (2006), 537. See 
also Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault. Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (1982), 
11; Hallward, “The Limits of Individuation,” 103. 
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in the rumbling, in the immediate negation of what it says, in a silence that is not the 
intimacy of a secret but a pure outside where words endlessly unravel.31 
Foucault takes great effort to describe everything beyond the edge of language as “pure 
outside”. When language truly faces this outside it cannot retain its latent state and “stich 
the old fabric of interiority back together in the form of an imagined outside.”32 Rather 
than “the images themselves”, this language involves “their transformation, 
displacement, and neutral interstices.”33 Considering the distinction between frozen 
images and the free movement of the imagination in Dream and Existence, it seems 
plausible to regard the outside as something that can only be sensed in the process of 
imagining. The work of literature is thus to balance between two risks: the obliteration of 
its subjectivity on the one hand and becoming a vehicle for the reproduction of discourse 
on the other. 
Foucault seems convinced about the critical potential of art on the level of discourse, 
but his way of situating art at the limit of discourse is problematic. The use of adjectives 
such as “rumbling” suggests that the “pure outside” has the power to affect the 
imagination, to put it into motion, while Foucault’s notion of discourse does not allow for 
any form of positivity or negativity outside discourse. It seems that affect provides a pre-
discursive position as a basis for criticism.  
Art and Power 
During the 1970s, Foucault’s perspective on subjectivation shifts from knowledge and its 
discourses to power. Power is not limited to language, but penetrates every aspect of life. 
Power is “everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from 
everywhere.”34 Frederic Jameson describes Foucault’s notion of power as “a wholly 
positivist landscape from which the negative has evaporated.”35 Foucault has been heavily 
criticized for this notion of power, especially by left-wing activists, because it leaves no 
room for criticism whatsoever.36 Two of his fiercest critics, Jürgen Habermas and Joan 
Copjec, reasoned that, if criticism requires a free subject, power rules out the possibility 
of criticism.37 
The idea that nothing can escape the consistently positive and immanent phenomenon 
of power, not even art, explains why Foucault’s publications of the 1970s hardly ever 
discuss works of art. In an interview with Roger-Pol Droit, published as “The Functions 
of Literature” (1975), Foucault states that literature is not fundamentally different from 
                                                 
31 Michel Foucault, “Maurice Blanchot: The Thought from Outside” [1986], in Michel Foucault and 
Maurice Blanchot, Foucault / Blanchot (1987), 22. 
32 Foucault, “Maurice Blanchot,” 21.  
33 Foucault, “Maurice Blanchot,” 23. 
34 Foucault, The History of Madness, 93. See also Vighi and Feldner, Žižek, 88. 
35 Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1991), 323. 
36 For an overview of this criticism, see Vighi and Feldner, Žižek, 90-93. 
37 Joan Copjec, Read My Desire. Lacan against the Historicists (1994), 6-7, 10; Jürgen Habermas, The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Twelve Lectures [1985] (1987), 294. 
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the other democratic institutions through which power operates in modern society such 
as detention, health care and education. The avant-garde and the establishment have 
completely agreed on the importance of literature; on the one hand it is considered a 
subversive force, on the other it is taught in all schools and universities with support of 
the government. Thus contributing to the illusion of freedom of speech, literature 
reproduces democratic power discourse, resulting in “a very heavy political blockage” for 
literature as a critical medium.38 
The question is whether the imagination, which offered a basis for criticism on the level 
of discourse, can escape power. The institutionalization of art does not necessarily imply 
that individuals have lost the capacity to be affected beyond the representations of 
discourse altogether. The questions of whether the imagination still involves a potential 
for real creativity and whether art can tap into this potential have not been asked by 
Foucault on the level of power. 
Art and the Free Subject 
When art re-emerges in Foucault’s work, the emphasis has shifted from the artwork to the 
making of art as the manifestation of an artistic life. In the lectures at the College de France, 
he discusses artworks from the ancient up to the modern period, with a heightened 
interest in ancient tragedy, and from this motley collection of artworks he claims to be 
gathering an “art of living”.39 
The shift in Foucault’s emphasis can be explained by his investigations on the level of 
power in the previous decade. In 1982, he writes that the goal of that investigation has not 
been “to analyze the phenomena of power, nor to elaborate the foundations of such an 
analysis. My objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different modes by 
which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects.”40 Here the investigation of power 
becomes visible as a sub-study, which must now be integrated into the pending question 
of the free subject. Evidently, Foucault’s positive and immanent notion of power called 
for a revision of his idea of criticism. 
The first revision prompted by Foucault’s notion of power is that criticism comes from 
within discourse, as there is no subjectivity possible outside discourse.41 Foucault pictures 
this form of criticism as a subject that, in the act of telling the truth, manifests its ethical 
relationship to the truth, thus explicating the processes of subjectivation enabling its truth-
telling. To articulate one’s personal relation to truth can be considered telling the truth 
about oneself, which is achieved through “care for self” and practiced in the form of “self-
technologies”. These practices are not aimed at knowledge of an essential self, but rather 
                                                 
38 Foucault, “The Functions of Literature,” 310. 
39 Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress,” interview by Paul 
Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus, April 1983, in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (1984), 350; Tanke, 
Foucault’s Philosophy of Art, 190-195. 
40 Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 777-778. 
41 Chris Weedon, Identity and Culture. Narratives of Difference and Belonging (2004), 19. Cq. Vighi en 
Feldner, Žižek, 90. 
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at ethical transformation. Foucault speaks of “subjectification”, a form of subjectivation 
by which the subject (re)produces and transforms itself as subject.42 On this level of the 
subject, Foucault does not speak of “discourse” or “power”, but of “modes of veridiction”, 
emphasizing the interrelatedness of truth and speech in the subject. The fact that he 
mainly uses the plural form (“modes of veridiction”) indicates that multiple modes can 
be practiced by one subject, society or artwork simultaneously. 
The second revision of criticism, or “truth-telling”, prompted by Foucault’s notion of 
power is that truth cannot be limited to epistemological discourse; it must be “an ‘answer’ 
to a concrete situation which is real.”43 In order for a subject to speak the truth, it has to 
put itself to the test of practices, conflicts, and deeds in an “active confrontation with 
power.”44 Here one recognizes parrhesia, the mode of truth-telling that requires the 
subject to articulate its relation to truth to the other. This revision elucidates Foucault’s 
earlier dismissal of modern art; not only are the institutions of modern art unsatisfactorily 
engaged in the search for confrontation, the institutionalization has also forced modern 
art to organize, specialize, catalogue, in other words subject itself to an epistemological 
discourse of art, resulting in a separation of art from the truly artistic life.45  
However, in 1984 Foucault states that art in the modern world is the pre-eminent site 
of truth-telling. Considered on the level of the subject, art meets both requirements for 
profound criticism, confronting discourse from within. Foucault reaches this conclusion 
as a result of his genealogy of truth-telling. He considers that this genealogy is interwoven 
with the history of Cynicism which, around the nineteenth century, finds a vehicle in the 
life of the modern artist: “modern art was, and still is for us the vehicle of the Cynic mode 
of being, of the principle of connecting style of life and manifestation of the truth. . . .”46 
Modern art, Cynicism and parrhesia are genealogically related in their aim for “[t]he 
emergence of the true life in the principle and form of truth- telling (telling the truth to 
others and to oneself, about oneself and about others). . . .”47 Where parrhesia manifests 
the true life, the artwork manifests the truly artistic life: 
the artist’s life, in the very form it takes, should constitute some kind of testimony of 
what art is in its truth. The artist’s life must not only be sufficiently singular for him to 
be able to create his work, but it must in some way be a manifestation of art itself in its 
truth.48 
                                                 
42 Foucault describes this process in “The Ethics of the Concern of The Self as a Practice of Freedom,” 
interview by H. Becker, R. Fornet-Betancourt and A. Gomez Muller, January 20, 1984, in Ethics. 
Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow (1997), 281-301. 
43 Foucault, Fearless Speech, 172. 
44 Gros, “Course Context,” in Foucault, The Government of Self, 382-383, 390. 
45 Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” 350. 
46 Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 187. 
47 Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 163. See also 235. 
48 Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 187. 
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The relation between art and truth-telling can be further clarified by Edward McGushin’s 
(2007) designation of parrhesia as “etho-poetic”.49 The ancient Greek poiēsis refers to the 
“deliberate fabrication in which the subject employs technē, ‘craft’ or ‘art’, in order to 
achieve a determinate outcome.”50 The prefix etho- indicates that this fabrication evolves 
from the good life, which Foucault, with respect to truth-telling, designates the “true life”. 
A subject that fashions its life in the way an artist creates an artwork cannot regard of its 
own subjectivity as a static given, because every fashioning will influence its self, and the 
future fashionings by this self. Foucault calls life a “work of art” and a “theatre of truth”, 
because the fashioning of the self is never finished, and the purpose of one’s life never 
determined.51 
Foucault’s aim to bring life back into philosophy positions him in the aesthetic tradition 
initiated by Alexander Baumgarten. Baumgarten’s Aesthetics (1758) countered René 
Descartes’s reduction of philosophy to logic. Assuming that only clear and distinct 
concepts could serve as building stones for true knowledge,52 Descartes banished the 
obscure and confused ideas from the realm of philosophy. Baumgarten, by demonstrating 
that Descartes’ distinction was irrelevant to aesthetic judgement, expanded philosophy 
beyond the Cartesian framework.53 His aesthetics, rather than a thinking about art, 
involved the very thinking of art, dictating its own criteria for sound judgment. Similarly, 
Foucault is not so much interested in the working of parrhesia in art as in its working 
through art. The idea that the working of parrhesia through art entails a thinking of art 
serves as the starting point for the next two parts of this essay.54 
This brief survey has shown how the different levels of Foucault’s research on the 
different modes by which human beings are made subjects interact. From early on, 
Foucault formulated aesthetical solutions to epistemic and political problems. His 
elaboration of power as a consistently positive and immanent phenomenon during the 
1970s urges him to search for new ways of freeing the subject in the 1980s. Art again plays 
a prominent role, although Foucault’s attention shifts to poiēsis, the making of the work. 
Whereas Poiēsis bridges the gap between the life of the artist and the artwork, it does not 
explain how the work affects the viewer in such a way that it generates a transformation. 
Even though a brief survey cannot do justice to the depth and diversity of Foucault’s 
                                                 
49 Edward McGushin, Foucault’s Askēsis. An Introduction to the Philosophical Life (2007), xv-xvi. 
50 McGushin, Foucault’s Askēsis, xviii. 
51 Michel Foucault, “The Personal Poetic Attitude of a Philosopher,” interview by Martin Jay et al., April 
1983, in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (1984), 373-380; Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 183, 186-
190; McGushin, Foucault’s Askēsis, 4. 
52 See Part IV in René Descartes, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, 
and Seeking Truth in the Sciences [1637] (1649). See also Birgit Kaiser, “Two Floors of Thinking: Deleuze's 
Aesthetics of Folds,” in Deleuze and the Fold. A Critical Reader, ed. Sjoerd van Tuinen and Niamh 
McDonnell (2010), 211. 
53 Kaiser, “Two Floors of Thinking,” 216-217. 
54 For an elaboration on this distinction, see Peter Lamarque and Stein Olsen, "Literature, Truth, and 
Philosophy," The Philosophy of Literature: Contemporary and Classic Readings. An Anthology, ed. Eileen 
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multilayered ideas, it enables a more diversified approach to his late discussions of art in 
this essay. 
2. TRUTH IN TRANSFORMATION 
In the following parts, two central notions in Foucault’s discussion of art will be 
dramatized. In the first part, the dramatization of “truth” provides insight into the process 
of transformation triggered by the artwork. In the second, the dramatization of the “basic” 
responds to the underlying question of how this process involves the viewer’s 
imagination. In both cases the viewer of the artwork corresponds to the subject of the 
thinking of art. 
Between 1971 and 1983, Foucault made no less than six interpretations of Oedipus 
King.55 His protracted fascination can be explained by the fact that truth-telling is the very 
catalyst for dramatic progression in the play. It presents a series of revelations through 
which the tragic hero Oedipus comes to realize that he has unwittingly murdered his 
father and married his own mother. Every revelation involves a “confrontation between 
competing regimes of veridiction,”56 as presented by the oracle of Delphi, the prophet 
Tiresias, Oedipus’s brother in law Creon, and a Corinthian messenger.57 Once Oedipus 
discovers his identity, he pierces his eyes, which had prevented him from seeing the truth.  
When Foucault discusses Oedipus King in 1983, it is in comparison to Ion, a tragedy by 
Euripides which turns out to mirror Oedipus’s search for truth. Concentrating on this 
search, Foucault observes that, although every single revelation brings Oedipus one step 
closer to the unbearable truth about himself, this progression is not simply linear. He 
compares the mechanism of Oedipus’s search for truth with the fitting together of the two 
halves of a symbolon. This is a broken piece of ceramics, the parts of which are kept by 
different persons as a means of mutual identification.58 Similarly, Oedipus receives 
different “pieces” of information about his origin, which he has to fit together in order to 
reveal his identity: “there is the paternal half, and then the maternal half, until the set of 
these elements reconstitute the whole of the truth.”59 The fitting together of the pieces can 
be regarded as a clash of different modes of veridiction which opens an “ethical 
difference” inside Oedipus, enabling him to speak the truth about himself.60 As such, 
Oedipus King manifests Foucault’s idea that the confrontation with otherness is crucial to 
the articulation of truth about ourselves. The editor of Foucault’s last lectures, Frédéric 
Gros, also emphasizes that the hallmark of “the true” for Foucault is otherness: “that 
which makes a difference in the world and in people’s opinions, that which forces one to 
                                                 
55 Foucault, The Government of Self, 94. 
56 Gros, “Course Context,” in Foucault, The Government of Self, 386. 
57 Gros, “Course Context,” in Foucault, The Government of Self, 385-386. 
58 Gros, “Course Context,” in Foucault, The Government of Self, 385-386; Szakolczai, The Genesis of 
Modernity, 147. 
59 Foucault, The Government of Self, 84. See also 117. 
60 Gros, “Course Context,” in Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 345-346. 
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transform one’s mode of being, that whose difference opens up the perspective of an other 
world to be constructed, to be imagined.”61 
The idea that otherness is the catalyst for truth, which in itself resides in transformation, 
characterizes Foucault’s discussions of art since the 1960s. The reading of Las meninas in 
1966 already described art as a journey between different epistemic standpoints, and the 
notion of the symbolon was introduced as early as 1971.62 What is new in Foucault’s 1983 
approach to Oedipus King is that this otherness is now crucial to speaking truth about 
oneself, in the sense of articulating one’s relation to the truth. Foucault emphasizes how 
“[i]n Oedipus, in fact, first of all it is Oedipus himself who brings truth-telling into play. It 
is Oedipus who wants to know the truth. As sovereign, and in order to restore peace and 
happiness in his town, he needs to know the truth.”63 
Why personal commitment is so important to the late Foucault becomes visible from a 
dramatization of his concept of truth. Deleuze explains that when a concept is dramatized 
it will fall apart in “two uneven, dissimilar and dissymmetrical ‘halves’, each one of these 
halves itself divided into two: an ideal half, plunging into the virtual . . .; an actual half, 
constituted both by the qualities incarnating these relations. . . .”64 This division of the 
concept Deleuze calls “differentiation”; it is the process by which virtual sensibilities and 
intuitions split off their ideal counterparts in order to become actual, and it can be made 
visible by dramatization. The dramatization of the concept of truth Deleuze describes as 
follows: 
Take the concept of truth: it is not enough to ask the abstract question “what is the 
true?”. Once we ask “who wants the truth, when and where, how and how much?” . . . 
we then learn that the concept of truth in representation is divided into two directions, 
one according to which the true emerges in person and in an intuition, the other 
according to which the true is always inferred from something else . . .65 
Combining both utterances, the actual part of the concept of truth can be inferred from 
something else, while the ideal part emerges in a person or an intuition. This division 
resonates Foucault’s description of the symbolon, the fitting together of which reveals 
Oedipus’ true identity. The actual part infers Oedipus’ identity from his parents, but this 
part only becomes meaningful once it is acknowledged and articulated by Oedipus before 
the chorus. The ideal part can thus be considered the truth that is manifested in the 
practice of truth-telling, in parrhesia. This ideal part does not represent an essential self, 
but is the manifestation of an immanent dynamics of transformation. 
On first sight, the modes of veridiction in Oedipus King do not seem to involve the ideal 
part of truth. Each time, truth is inferred from something else; the oracle and the prophet 
                                                 
61 Gros, “Course Context,” in Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 356. Remarkably, Gros refers to the 
significance of the imagination for transformation, which Foucault does not.  
62 Michel Foucault, Lectures on the Will to Know. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1970-1971 and Oedipal 
Knowledge, ed. Daniel Defert (2011), 229-261. 
63 Foucault, The Government of Self, 84. 
64 Deleuze, “The Method of Dramatisation,” 585. 
65 Deleuze, “The Method of Dramatisation,” 583. 
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speak on behalf of the gods, the messenger brings news from abroad, and Creon is a 
brother in-law. However, when Oedipus’s actions in search for his identity are regarded 
as self-technologies, then the anagnōrisis – the moment of insight reached by the hero, 
usually in the fifth act – becomes visible as an instance of the ideal part of truth. Oedipus’s 
insight is that, out of the many modes of veridiction he engaged with, there was not one 
that provided the comprehensive truth about himself, because this truth only emerges in 
truth-telling as the manifestation of a transformation. This means that the confrontation 
with otherness, for Foucault, does not only lie in the revelation of an inconvenient truth 
before the other, but also in the transformation of the subject into an other. This explains 
why Foucault kept returning to Oedipus King; by putting ever new “grids” over the text, 
he was opening up ever new modes of veridiction.66 
In the broader framework of Foucault’s late lectures, Oedipus’s anagnōrisis functions as 
an allegory of parrhesia. Foucault has discussed various vehicles by which elements of 
parrhesia have been passed down to the modern period, one of them being modern art, 
as the etho-poetic manifestation of the truly artistic life. However, what becomes apparent 
in the dramatization of the concept of truth in Foucault’s discussion of Oedipus King is that 
not only does the making of art involve elements of parrhesia, but the reception and 
interpretation of art may involve a process of truth-telling as well. Foucault’s many 
different readings of the play can be considered a series of transformations in which truth 
is repeatedly veiled and unveiled. This tenacious urge to transform one’s thought in 
lectures and publications may be considered a manifestation of the true life, which is 
continuously confronting its own limits from within. It is through this repetitive thinking 
of an artwork that Foucault aims to bring life back into philosophy. 
What this life looks like can be inferred from Foucault’s reading of the final scene of 
Oedipus King, where Oedipus, after acknowledging the ideal part of truth, gouges out his 
eyes. As Deleuze states, ideas are cruel, they are “shining points that pierce us,”67 
condemning Oedipus to “the night of his blindness”. Now that Oedipus has become 
perceptive of the sensations of the ideal world, he no longer needs his eyesight. He can 
orient himself on intuitions. However, according to Deleuze, the subjects of this world 
cannot be “formed, qualified and composed” subjects “like that of the Cogito in 
representation.”68 They “can only be partial [ébauches], not yet qualified or composed, 
patients rather than agents, alone able to bear the pressure of an internal resonance or the 
amplitude of a forced movement.”69 The blind wanderer Oedipus is a partial subject, 
complemented by other partial subjects: 
And what is left to guide him as he passes through this world without shelter or 
homeland? . . . he has only the voice of his daughters who guide him, and his own voice 
that he hears floating in the air without being able to place it, not knowing where he is, 
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not knowing where it is. And through this wandering, guided only by the exchange of 
voices between father and daughters, Oedipus returns to Greek soil, where he will find, 
precisely at Athens, his final resting place.70  
Foucault’s thinking of art does not confront one, but rather an infinite series of limits, 
which become visible as thresholds to different modes of veridiction, resulting in an 
endless veiling and unveiling of truth, a continuous process of subjectivation and 
subjectification. In this process an ideal world opens up, underlying the world of 
representations. This world is bewandered by partial subjects who know themselves to 
be interrelated with other partial subjects through their imagination. 
3. “A DRAMA BENEATH ALL LOGOS”  
In his 1984 discussion of Manet´s painting Luncheon on the Grass, Foucault describes the 
way in which the artwork affects the viewer as an “irruption of the basic [l’élémentaire]”. 
He discusses this work in the context of the Cynic mode of being, which is manifested, as 
said, in the life of the modern artist, but also in the idea that art must establish a “violent 
reduction of existence to its basics”.71 In this part, the notion of ‘the basic’ will be 
dramatized to make it visible as the indifference that harbors the process of 
differentiation. 
Luncheon on the Grass shows three figures sitting in a park; two men wearing grey suits 
seem to be engaged in a discussion, while a female nude looks the viewer straight in the 
eye. The painting was received by the art critics of the Paris Salon as a provocation. By 
transposing the well-known composition of Raphael’s The Judgement of Paris (c. 1510-1520) 
to the unworthy context of a cocotte with two customers in the infamous Bois de Boulogne, 
Manet had depicted the classical values of the Salon as outdated and hypocritical. This 
point was further emphasized by Manet’s painting techniques; omitting the dark under-
painting and refraining from claire-obscure lighting, the flat wide surface of the female 
body looks far more “naked” than the classical nudes in Salon paintings. The manner in 
which this nude, traditionally the object of art, gazes steadily into the face of the viewer, 
lends the finishing touch to what Foucault calls the “great scandal of Manet”. 
In an earlier lecture on the painting in 1971,72 Foucault concentrates on the juxtaposition 
of “two systems of manifesting light” inside the painting, which he interprets as two 
systems of representation, meeting in the hand of the right male figure: 
so here you have this hand with its two fingers, one finger which points in . . . the 
direction of the interior light, of this light which comes from above and from elsewhere. 
And on the contrary the finger is bent, bent towards the outside, on the axis of the 
picture, and it indicates the origin of the light which strikes here, in such a way that you 
                                                 
70 Foucault, The Government of Self, 85. 
71 Foucault, The Courage of Truth, 188. 
72 Michel Foucault, Manet and the Object of Painting [2009] (2011), 60-63. 
MARRIGJE PAIJMANS 
 
Foucault Studies, No. 26, p. 42-63  57  
have in this hand-play the fundamental axes of the picture and the principle – at once 
of linking and of heterogeneity – of this Luncheon on the Grass.73 
 
The hand mediates between the two domains of representation, which, as Foucault 
assumes in 1971, is also the function of art. 
What fascinates Foucault in 1984, however, is the nude. He believes nakedness to be 
the central theme in modern art: “This is the idea that art itself, whether it is literature, 
painting, or music, must establish a relation to reality which is no longer one of 
ornamentation, or imitation, but one of laying bare, exposure, stripping, excavation, and 
violent reduction of existence to its basics.”74 Foucault’s interest has shifted from the 
mediating to the reductive function of art. This reduction involves both an “anti-
Aristotelian” and an “anti-Platonic” element. Modern art is anti-Aristotelian in the sense 
that it “establishes a polemical relationship of reduction, refusal, and aggression to 
culture, social norms, values, and aesthetic canons.” It is anti-Platonic because, instead of 
representing transcendent ideas, it articulates “what in a culture has no right, or at least 
no possibility of expression.”75 Foucault understands culture as a “consensus” which “has 
to be opposed by the courage of art in its barbaric truth.”76 In this sense, modern art is the 
“site of the irruption of the basic”, the basic indicating a realm of obscure ideas that are 
suppressed by culture. The intensity of these ideas, however, leads to regular irruptions 
into the realm of culture. In this process, art seems to function as an escape valve or rather 
as a volcano that discharges the pressure from subterrestrial magma flows on the surface 
of existence. In terms of parrhesia, art “speaks” boldly for those voices that are structurally 
unheard.77 
Foucault’s notion of the basic closely resembles that of the Dionysian, in that it 
designates the suppression of behavior which is necessary for a culture to regard itself as 
civilized, or Apollonian. In that respect, it is interesting that Deleuze calls dramatization 
an “actualization of the Dionysian”. Since dramatization is an epistemological method, 
Deleuze’s Dionysian designates an aspect of Western thought. He relates the Apollonian 
to the line in Western thought that runs from Plato via Descartes to Kant, and which 
established a virtually undisputed hierarchy of transcendent ideas (Plato) or concepts 
(Descartes and Kant) over sensations.78 In his lecture on dramatization, Deleuze primarily 
aims to overthrow the Kantian schema as it builds on Descartes’s claim that philosophy 
deals exclusively with clear and distinct concepts, rejecting the obscure and confused 
ideas. Deleuze deems this “clear cut” illusionary. He refers to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
(1646-1716), who demonstrated that certain Cartesian concepts, like color, smell and taste, 
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may be clear, but they are certainly also confused.79 Similarly, Deleuze argues, Plato’s 
ideas may be distinct, but they are also obscure, that is inaccessible to human thought: 
“the Idea in itself is not clear and distinct, but on the contrary distinct and obscure. It is 
even in this sense that the Idea is Dionysian, in this zone of obscure distinction that it 
conserves in itself. . . .”80 Ironically, Deleuze appropriates Plato’s idea as a model for the 
obscure dynamisms underlying representation, which he eventually utilizes to subvert 
the Kantian concepts: “The clear and the distinct is the claim of the concept in the 
Apollonian world of representation; but beneath representation there is always the Idea 
and its distinct-obscure ground, a ‘drama’ beneath all logos.”81  
Deleuze’s use of the word “ground” (fond) is informative with respect to Foucault’s 
concept of the basic. Ground is the indifference harboring the power of differentiation, 
“the potential of a dissolution of distinctions and forms.”82 This differentiation Deleuze 
considers a “drama” because the indifference itself can never become actual. A 
dramatization of the basic leads to the insight that indifference remains unrepresented in 
Western thought, while under the surface chaos persists: “The state of this world is well 
expressed in the image of the murmur, of the ocean, of the water mill, of the swoon or 
even of drunkenness, which bears witness to a Dionysian ground rumbling beneath this 
apparently Apollonian philosophy.”83  
CONCLUSION 
The hypothesis that parrhesia works through art by triggering a process of veiling and 
unveiling truth in the imagination can now be further specified. The dynamics of 
confrontation and transformation have always been characteristic of Foucault’s 
understanding of art. The heterogeneity of the artwork allowed for the imagination to 
move freely between different systems of representation, opening and closing 
perspectives. When Foucault, in his late lectures, speaks of how parrhesia works through 
art, two additional aspects should be emphasized. Firstly, the working of parrhesia 
through art implies that the artwork manifests life. Foucault describes this as the truly 
artistic life of the nineteenth-century artist that expresses itself, through poiesis, in the 
artwork. This artistic process seems to run parallel to the process by which the viewer, in 
viewing the work, engages in the thinking of art as a philosophical expression of the true 
life. This etho-poetic truth, a truth in the making, a truth of transformative and life-
changing practice, is what Foucault aims to engage with in his thinking of art. Secondly, 
the thinking of art emphasizes the immanent dynamics of truth-telling. Art, in taking its 
creative force from an obscure and unrepresentable realm of ideas, reflects the process of 
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speaking the truth about oneself, the ‘self’ involving one’s intuitive and dynamic, that is, 
unrepresentable relation to truth. One might say that parrhesiastic art taps into a positive 
and immanent notion of power, as the necessary means for subjectivation and 
subjectification, opening up a space inside discourse, confronting its limits from within. 
Foucault’s poetic and immanent notion of truth bears close resemblance to the pure 
“creating” that Deleuze’s calls the virtual. Without losing sight of the fact that Foucault 
does not aim to advance a philosophical theory of art, it is nevertheless interesting to 
observe how the theoretical gaps in his thinking of art fill up when it is brought into 
contact with Deleuze’s aesthetics. The dramatization of two central concepts in Foucault’s 
discussions of parrhesiastic art made visible how the creative force of the thinking of art 
enfolds from an obscure realm underlying the representations. It also exposed the 
“drama” that the truth itself, as the militant refusal of objectification and subjectivation, 
can never be specified. 
In viewing an artwork, the viewer is confronted with sensations that the imagination 
cannot imagine or represent. Instead of producing an image, the imagination transforms, 
enabled by the viewer’s tapping into the indifference of the truly artistic life. The viewer 
grafts his experience onto this life, while the art starts to work in the life of the viewer, for 
the viewer and the work to become partial subjects in the thinking of art. This intuitive an 
intense process is visualized by Oedipus’s groping search for his native soil and Manet’s 
scandal of the nude. When Foucault speaks of art as the site of truth-telling in the modern 
world, not only the making but also the viewing and thinking of art can be considered 
“self-technologies”, in which the “self” corresponds to the imagination, as the least 
specified stage of thought where virtual sensibilities and intuitions enter our bodies, and 
“technologies” to the exploration of this imagination.  
Foucault and Deleuze meet in their anti-Platonic effort to expose the obscure 
dynamisms beneath the representations because they both combine aesthetics and ethics. 
Foucault’s ethical practices involve an aesthetic exploration of the imagination, while 
Deleuze’s aesthetic approach of sensibility and becoming always imply entering ethical 
relationships. By reminding Western thought of the whisper, the swoon and the murmur 
in art, both thinkers show ethical commitment to the aesthetic pursuit to bring life back 
into philosophy. 
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